IICSA - Analysis of CSAS and NCSC Safeguarding policies

This is the text of the covering note of an analysis of CSAS and NCSC Safeguarding policies which I have submitted to the Inquiry.

1.       I have carried out an analysis of the NCSC/CSAS Safeguarding policy, similar in nature to the Mandate Now analysis of the Anglican church safeguarding policy submitted to the Inquiry, to which I contributed.

2.       The version I have analysed was provided by CSAS to Mr Tom Perry of Mandate Now. The correspondence between Mr Perry and CSAS is separately submitted. There was a significant delay in doing so, and when it arrived it was split into 130 separate PDF files.

3.       Given the many past safeguarding failures within the Roman Catholic Church and most specifically failures to report known or suspected abuse to the statutory authorities, and given the absence of a statutory duty to report (a “mandatory reporting” law) I have considered what would persuade me that the Roman Catholic Church is truly intent on improving its safeguarding and avoid slipping back into past habits of concealment.

4.       The test I have applied is a simple one: in the absence of a statutory duty, I have considered whether it is plain that a failure to report known abuse or reasonable suspicions thereof would unequivocally breach the church’s own policies.

5.       For a failure to report suspicions of abuse to be a clear and unambiguous breach of the policy, the policy would need to meet the following more detailed criteria:

5.1.        The reporting arrangements are clearly stated, and use wording that does not allow for discretion as to whether a report is made

5.2.        The policy does not allow varying interpretations of its meaning and intent.

5.3.        The policy is clear, accessible, and easy to read and understand.

5.4.        It is clear who within the church is given various responsibilities to act.

6.              In my analysis I have concentrated on the files in “Chapter 2 - Responding to allegations and concerns” and “Chapter 3 - Information Sharing and Data Protection” on the basis that these areas are key to ensuring that abuse is properly reported and information about it is shared with the statutory authorities.

7.              Within Chapter 2, the key document is “Children management of allegations and concerns”. By the criteria defined above, this is a dreadfully poor document. Specifically:

7.1.        Procedures are frequently defined using the word “should” which offers a degree of discretion about how or even whether a procedure is followed (as opposed to “must” which removes that discretion). Even though the policy does not have the backing of a mandatory reporting law, it would be perfectly proper to use “must” in procedures, to make it clear that failure to act as indicated is a breach of Church policies.

7.2.        There is frequent use of passive voice, so it is not clear who has responsibility to carry out an action. Without the responsibility being assigned to some specific person or role, there is no accountability and no means of taking disciplinary action against anybody for failing to act.

7.3.        The same procedure is defined a number of times in different places within the document, each with a slightly different form of words and with no statement as to which is the authoritative version of the procedure.

7.4.        Where immediate danger to a child is identified, the procedures tend to use “should”, whereas where there is judged to be no immediate danger, “must” is used, but solely in the context of internal communication within the church, not to informing external authorities.

7.5.        Paragraph 2.2 incorrectly makes reference to “a legal responsibility to pass on” information. This is legally incorrect, there is (unfortunately) no such legal obligation, and this gives rise to concern for the knowledge and competence of the document’s authors.

7.6.        In the same paragraph 2.2 the strongest wording yet used in the document: “it is vital” refers to the need for confidentiality because “allegations can affect livelihoods and reputations”. This seems to indicate that the true priority of the church remains the protection of its own reputation.

7.7.        Section 3 of the document indicates that parental consent will normally be sought to make a referral to LA Children’s Services. This is exceedingly unsound safeguarding practice and is one of the concerns I expressed 10 years ago about the version of the safeguarding policy of St Benedict’s School at the time. There are two reasons why this is unsound. First, it is all too easy to manipulate parents into withholding consent. The authority of the church can be used to persuade parents that it is not in their child’s best interest to have strangers from children’s services asking questions, or someone might even falsely suggest that suspicion is likely to fall upon the parents. Second, other children may be at risk now or in the future from the same offender, and it is important that the matter is put in the hands of those with the training and authority to investigate effectively.

7.8.        Section 4.1 defines circumstances in which the LADO “must” be contacted, but uses passive voice so leaved it unstated as to who must act.

7.9.        Section 4.2 covers much the same ground but uses the word “should” instead of “must”. It is not clear which paragraph takes precedence,

7.10.    Section 9 of the document, describing “Temporary removal from Ministry, Ecclesiastical Office or other Post” talks of the need to “prevent scandal”, and this is placed on equal footing with other reasons for temporary removal. I find it troubling that the church even now considers its reputation, and the prevention of scandal, to be a valid consideration when defining its policies for the safeguarding of the children in its care.

8.              The items above are by no means an exhaustive list of the shortcomings of this document, but provide a reasonable summary of the key issues.

9.              In Chapter 3, the key document is “26.11.18 National Safeguarding Information Sharing Protocol”. It manages to get through several pages of introductory text before coming to any specific procedures. The following are some specific matters of concern:

9.1.        Within Section 2, there is a paragraph titled Is there a clear and legitimate purpose for sharing the information?” No specific criteria are given for when a lawful purpose might be applicable. A list of lawful bases is included in a Schedule to an appendix in the document, this schedule is nowhere referred to within the main body of the document and so could easily be missed.

9.2.        A little later there is a section “Is the information subject to a duty of confidence?” This is far more specific. The contrast between the wording which encourages sharing and wording which discourages is quite notable. The contrast is repeated further into the document.

9.3.        Towards the end of the document is a series of Case Examples. The first paragraph of the first case example is worth quoting in full.

“Where you have reasonable cause to believe that a child or young person has suffered, or is likely to suffer significant harm, you must always consider referring your concerns to Children's Services or Police in line with national policy and your Local Safeguarding Children's Board procedures.” (my emphasis)

The emphasised wording is far short of an unequivocal direction to refer concerns, it is merely an instruction to consider referring, and after consideration the person is free to decide not to refer.

9.4.        The case examples are full of discretionary wording – the word “should” is used all over the place. It is unclear how the case examples link to the body of the text. The examples don’t for instance say something to the effect “section x of this document is applicable and therefore the person with this information must do y”.

9.5.        The case examples are preceded by this introductory paragraph.

“The examples set out below indicate the likely application of relevant rules and good practice etc but should not be taken as definitive guidance and you should take independent legal advice in relation to your specific situation as required.”

So these case studies are not “definitive guidance” and are merely “likely application of relevant rules”, which bring into question whether the “relevant rules” are even contained within this document.

10.          I attach detailed analyses of several documents within the CSAS-NCSC set. Lack of time has not permitted all the documents to be looked at in the same level of detail. Those that I have analysed are all in the same form, placed into landscape page layout with the original text on the left and my detailed comments on the right.

11.          As should by now be plain, if anybody within the Roman Catholic Church wished to conceal suspected abuse from the statutory authorities, they would find ample wriggle room within these documents permitting them to do so while still plausibly being able to claim that they conform to the NCSC/CSAS policies. As a result, I do not consider that the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales has yet come to terms with the need for rigour in its safeguarding policies, and that continued poor safeguarding practice and even downright concealment of abuse is by no means ruled out by the existence and even enforcement of these policies.

12.          It took me four years of campaigning from 2009 to 2013 to have such wriggle room removed from the safeguarding policy of St. Benedict’s School. Analysing these documents has been a profoundly dispiriting experience, to discover that all the weaknesses that I worked so hard to remove in the St. Benedict’s safeguarding policy remain in the church’s national policies. I had hoped that I would have found something better, but on examining these documents it appears to me that the Roman Catholic Church nationally has learned absolutely nothing from the scandals of Ealing and elsewhere.

13.          If the Inquiry reaches the similar conclusions based on the evidence before it, then it is inevitable that questions must arise as to the willingness and ability of the Church voluntarily to reform its procedures. The Church has had 25 years since publication of Bishop Budd’s report, and if this policy is the pinnacle of the progress that has been achieved so far, then on present rates of improvement I doubt that properly robust policies will be written and implemented before the end of this century.

14.          Since it is clear that the Church is either unwilling or unable (it doesn’t really matter which) voluntarily to ensure that child protection concerns are reliably reported to the statutory authorities, consideration needs to be given as to methods of compulsion that might be applied.

15.          The most obvious remedy is a “mandatory reporting law” along the lines proposed by Mandate Now in its various submissions to the Inquiry. It is my belief that individuals in the church will be far more willing to report concerns if they risk prosecution for a deliberate failure to do so.

16.          A second remedy, dependent on the existence of a mandatory reporting law, would be an inspection body independent of the church which could review policies and even case notes, and bring anything to the attention of the authorities that should have been disclosed. Given the past culture and practices of the Roman Catholic Church, the deterrent effect of a mandatory reporting law can only be assumed to operate fully where those subject to it are given reason to believe that there is a high risk of wrongdoing being detected and punished. Hence the need for regular outside scrutiny of its safeguarding practices.