IICSA Report - Outside agencies

Those running Ealing Abbey and St. Benedict's School, and those committing abuses there (sometimes but not always the same people) were able to get away with the abuse and the cover up for so long because of mistakes, systemic problems and plain incompetence on the part of outside agencies.

First I'll raise a point not made in the report perhaps because the report is not making recommendations at this stage. The non-abusers in senior positions in the Roman Catholic Church are highly-educated, law-abiding people. Both hyphenated adjectives are important. They are law-abiding because they don't want to get into trouble with the law. After all, they see themselves as the good guys. They are highly-educated and therefore are able to judge with great precision how close to the edge of the law they dare encroach.

They did not promptly report suspicions of abuse because legally they didn't have to. (During the Downside & Ampleforth hearing, Abbot Richard Yeo clearly stated that unreported incidents would have been reported had there been a law requiring it, and that he would have obeyed such a law.) But we have no "mandatory reporting" in the UK, and as a result clerical loyalty and maintaining the reputation of the church took priority over the welfare of the children in the church's care.

Had a mandatory reporting law existed (as exists in about 80% of countries worldwide) requiring those with reasonable suspicions to report them, it would have been utterly impossible for Soper, Pearce and Maestri to have abused unhindered for so long. To give one characteristic example from the report:

Dr Dachs was the lay headmaster of St Benedict’s senior school between 1986 and 2002. During this time Pearce was head of the separate junior school. As such, Pearce was not under Dr Dachs authority, however like Abbot Rossiter and Soper, Dr Dachs was aware of the complaints about Pearce. For example, on 19 October 1998, the parents of RC-A631 complained by letter to him. Dr Dachs did not raise those concerns with any external authority.

Harsha Mortemore, senior accounts assistant at St Benedict’s, stated that when she raised her concerns with Dr Dachs he warned her “If you know what’s good for you, keep your head down and do your job.” Dr Dachs has denied this.

Had there been a mandatory reporting law in place at the time these events occurred, it is most unlikely that Dr. Dachs would have dared to say what the inquiry clearly believes he did say to Ms. Mortemore. With a mandatory reporting law in place, and if he were foolish enough still to say it, it is quite possible that Ms. Mortemore, knowing she had the law on her side, would have been emboldened to call Ealing Children's Services directly. In doing so she would have had two things to report: her original concerns about Pearce and what would have been Dr. Dachs' potentially criminal action in telling her to keep quiet.

This is how a mandatory reporting law would utterly change the landscape. It would empower those who wish to report but (like Ms. Mortemore) justifiably fear the consequences for themselves if they do. It would make suppressing reports a criminal act and therefore very dangerous.

But we don't, and as a result those fragmentary reports that did reach external authorities were often missed, though inadequate correlation, or plain incompetence. As a result the inquiry has harshly criticised the Metropolitan Police, The Crown Prosecution Service, the Charity Commission, the Independent Schools Inspectorate, the Department for Education and Ealing Council Children's Services. If criticism of these bodies is less than that of the church, it is because their failure was down to incompetence rather than malice. They were not actively engaged in a cover-up of abuse that they knew had happened.

Metropolitan Police Service
In 2001, the police did not adequately investigate complaints from four separate boys. Commander Jerome giving evidence said that this was unreasonable as there was evidence of sexual assault. There was a similar failure in 1992.

There is no evidence that the 1992 case file relating to RC-A595 was properly considered. There is nothing in the police records to indicate that the allegation of RC-A418 was referred to social services. This was particularly striking as Pearce was still working and living at the Abbey, adjacent to the school. Given the concerted effort of a teacher, Katherine Ravenscroft, and a monk, Father Alban Nunn, to bring concerns about Pearce to the Metropolitan Police’s attention, it is regrettable that this investigation into RC-A418’s complaint should then have been handled and dismissed in such a manner.

The report details several other failures to investigate Pearce appropriately, some of these dated back to the early 1990s. Pearce was eventually convicted in 2009.

Then there was Soper. He absconded in 2011 when supposedly on his way from Rome to the UK to attend a police bail appointment. It took five years to track him down.

After Soper absconded in March 2011, the Metropolitan Police waited over four years before passing the task of reaching him to a specialist team with dedicated resources. Two officers who were then involved, DS Chris Sloan and DS Shaun Richardson, told us that:

“In hindsight the ‘manhunt’ for SOPER should not have been left with the original investigating Child Abuse Investigating Team (CAIT) overseen by a single investigating Officer. This task should have been passed to those with specialisms in this area of work, who have a wide range of resources at their disposal. Once this was done, in and around December 2015 and primacy was passed to an MPS Major Investigation Team (MIT), SOPER was detained in Kosovo within six months (May 2016).”

Crown Prosecution Service
A case concerning Pearce was passed to the CPS in 1992. Although arguably even by today's standards "this would still be a challenging case to prosecute" there were in the CPS advice not to prosecute, as the report notes:

Mr McCabe’s reasoning as set out in his written advice raises other questions:

• He concluded that there was no corroborative evidence, whereas Gregor McGill, Director of Legal Services at the Crown Prosecution Service, agreed that there was some evidence that corroborated RC-A595’s account.
• Mr McCabe noted that there was no medical evidence of a physical injury from the alleged indecent assault. However, it is unlikely that any injury would have resulted from an assault of the nature alleged. As Mr McGill told us:

“A prosecutor today would not expect there to be medical evidence arising from an indecent assault of the nature alleged by the complainant and would be aware that the absence of such evidence is not evidence of no assault having occurred.”
• Mr McCabe stressed that there had been a delay in RC-A595 telling his sister, and some inconsistencies between the accounts he gave to his sister and mother. As Commander Jerome noted, neither delay nor inconsistency is unexpected in the context of a young boy having gone through a traumatic incident.

Of themselves none of these considerations should have been seen as a bar to prosecution.

Again, there were errors handling Soper's case.

Soper was not convicted until 2017, although in 2004 the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute him in respect of the allegations made by RC-A622 of abuse and multiple rapes.

Although these were grave allegations, Claudette Phillips, the Crown Prosecution Service reviewing lawyer, having advised orally, in writing justified her decision not to charge only very briefly, expressing the view that the allegation “is essentially the victim’s version of events against the suspects [sic]”. She also failed to consider whether other supporting evidence might be available or could be sought, and did not advise the Metropolitan Police on these points. The decision not to charge and the advice given were inadequate. Mr McGill accepts this, although he told us that “we approach these cases in a completely different way in 2019 than we did in 2004”.

The Charity Commission
The Charity Commission carried out two statutory inquiries into Ealing Abbey/St. Benedict's. The report states:

The first inquiry (from 2006 to 2009) was opened following concerns of child sexual abuse being brought to its attention anonymously in June 2006 in respect of Pearce and RC‑F41. Its purpose was to establish whether the trustees had taken appropriate action and what further steps were required, if any.

The inquiry was not impressed with the approach taken.

The Charity Commission’s conclusion that appropriate steps were being taken was based on little more than assurances given by Ealing Abbey that there were restrictions on Pearce, precluding access to children. The Commission did not seek to identify in any detail what those restrictions were, nor did it consider how they were being implemented or how compliance was being monitored. Michelle Russell, Head of Compliance at the Charity Commission between 2007 and 2011, told us that this reliance on the assurances of charity trustees “was the approach that was taken by the Commission generally as a regulator at that time”. The Charity Commission also found that the school’s child protection policies and procedures were adequate. This again appears to be in part based on the Trust’s assertion in correspondence that they were. Relying on assurances given by a body under investigation can never be a sufficient substitute for independent scrutiny.

One would have thought that last sentence was a classic statement of the bleeding obvious, but it didn't occur to the Charity Commission at the time.

On learning that Pearce had abused another child despite the assurances given, the Charity Commission opened another investigation which resulted in a critical report. The strength of the criticism was, according to Ms. Russell when giving evidence “quite unusual language for us to say publicly”. Despite this criticism, no further regulatory action was taken.

We then move to perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Charity Commission's actions at this time. The report states:

A further point is that, during this second inquiry, Charity Commission correspondence risked suggesting that protecting the charity’s name required contesting allegations of abuse as a matter of course. For example, a senior compliance and support manager stated in a letter of May 2008:

“A charity’s reputation is one of its biggest assets. As such, we would expect the trustees to take measures to protect the reputation of the Charity in the future. As a minimum, we would expect the trustees to monitor carefully the outcome of any criminal investigation or prosecution or civil claim into Father Pearce or any other person involved with the Charity in a similar capacity and to take appropriate steps to protect the Charity’s name and reputation as necessary. We would also expect the Charity to take reasonable steps to defend its name and reputation if any charges or proceedings were initiated against the Charity. If such a situation were to arise, I would suggest that you contact the Commission for advice.”

This letter, and the penultimate sentence in particular, could give the impression that defending reputation was more important than protecting children from abuse. While she said this was not the Commission’s intention, Ms Russell agreed that there was a risk that it might be read that way, and that it was something for the Commission to reflect on.

Given that Ealing Abbey was already inclined to cover up even well-founded allegations of abuse, this advice in my view could only have been taken by those in charge as an open invitation to redouble their efforts.

The Charity Commission appears not to have even considered taking regulatory action when it was clear that the efforts of Ealing Abbey were inadaquate:

Beyond providing “regulatory advice and guidance”, the Charity Commission relied in its report upon the fact that Ealing Abbey was undertaking “an independent review”. It requested a copy of this review, and said it would “actively monitor the Charity to ensure that this happens”.

The independent review referred to was that undertaken by Philip Wright and John Nixson in 2009. As discussed in Part D, that review was wholly inadequate. Its deficiencies were pointed out to the Charity Commission in 2010 by Mr Jonathan West, to whom the Commission responded in December 2010:

“The independent review that the trustees confirmed would be carried out is a matter for the Charity. The Commission cannot intervene in the administration of a charity.”
However no reference was made in this letter to the possibility, in certain circumstances, of the Commission appointing an interim manager.

Independent Schools Inspectorate
The Inquiry concluded that the ISI made a right pig's ear of its 2009 inspection.

The 2009 inspections were flawed in a number of ways.

The inspectors did not obtain a full picture of child protection concerns in respect of St Benedict’s, including the extent of the offences for which Pearce was convicted and the fact of the Charity Commission inquiry. Whilst the deficiencies in the level of disclosure given by the school and Abbot Shipperlee as chair of governors was a contributory factor, this does not provide a sufficient excuse. The ISI itself should have undertaken further steps to obtain and check relevant information both prior to and during their inspection, especially when the inspectors discovered that David Pearce had recently been convicted of sexually abusing a pupil. As explained by Kate Richards, Chief Inspector since 2017, the ISI now makes specific inquiries of both the local authority and the school itself about allegations and safeguarding incidents, as well as searching for relevant information in the public domain.

The ISI found, wrongly, that the school’s child protection policy was compliant, despite obvious defects, in particular with regard to external reporting. These were picked up in the 2010 inspection but should have been identified earlier. The failure is the more striking given the fact that the reporting inspector noted in his pre-inspection commentary:

“We shall need to be particularly alert and meticulous in checking all policies and procedures concerned with child protection.”

The 2009 ISI reports confused the independent review into Pearce’s offending (which was undertaken by Mr Nixson and Mr Wright) and what the inspector was told about advice provided by the Diocesan child protection officer and another safeguarding professional in respect of RC-F41’s restrictions. The senior school report stated:

“A serious incident involving a member of the monastic community caused the trustees to request an independent review of the measures taken to minimise risk.”

This plainly related to the review into Pearce’s re-offending, but it went on to state that the advice of that independent review had been implemented, which was an error. The advice of Mr Wright and Mr Nixson arising out of their review had not even been given at the time of the ISI inspection, still less implemented.

It took members of the public to inform them of the magnitude of their failure.

On 11 February 2010, shortly after the publication of its reports, Mr Jonathan West contacted the ISI expressing concerns. He did not think that the independent review had yet happened, as the Charity Commission had reported that it had been promised but not received in December 2009. The next day another member of the public, Michael Grant, contacted the ISI because he was “appalled by the report with regards to the issue of child protection”. He referred to the fact that David Pearce was the former head of the junior school and had lost a civil action as well as being “jailed for eight years after thirty-five years of systematic abuse”.

The ISI, on the DfE's instructions, kept a much closer and more critical eye on St. Benedict's thereafter. The inquiry clearly thinks that these interventions made all the difference. They clearly think that the shortcomings of the 2009 inspection were probably not an anomaly but on the contrary were characteristic of the organisation.

However, had it not been for the intervention of members of the public, the ISI might not have re-appraised the safeguarding arrangements at St Benedict’s in 2010 and thereafter. Its approach to the inspection of St Benedict’s in 2009 fell far short of what should be expected of an independent inspectorate.

Department for Education
The DfE doesn't fare well either. As the report says:

The DfE’s involvement with Ealing Abbey and St Benedict’s was limited until significant problems were identified.

In 2007, the DfE agreed to commission an ISI inspection of St Benedict’s in 2009. There is no evidence that the DfE relayed to the ISI before its 2009 inspections the fact that the Charity Commission had contacted the DfE in 2007 regarding allegations made against Pearce and RC-F41.

In 2009, the ISI asked the DfE whether it should do anything in addition to that scheduled inspection, following an email from Ealing Children’s Services. That email arose from an anonymous letter which made reference to “things being hushed up”. The DfE contacted the local authority designated officer (LADO) at Ealing, and was told by the LADO that the Ealing Child Protection Strategy Group wanted to flag with the DfE the comments in the letter “that indicated the school ethos was to cover up any problems”, although no other information or explanation was given in the letter. The LADO said that the headmaster, Christopher Cleugh, had appeared to cooperate fully. The LADO did not relate the history of Pearce’s offending with RC-A621, nor the fact of his arrest and pending prosecution, or that RC-F41 had also been the subject of historic allegations. Ealing Council (through its LADO) should have been in a position to inform the DfE of such facts.

It appears that it was only after concerns were raised with the ISI by Jonathan West and Michael Grant that the independent education and school governance division of the DfE became aware of the Charity Commission report of December 2009, and the scale of the problem at Ealing Abbey and St Benedict’s. This was despite exchanges in 2006/7 with the Charity Commission, the exchange in 2009 with the LADO and the DfE having a press cuttings service to alert it to safeguarding issues in independent schools.

Ealing Council Children's Services
We have another catalogue of error and incompetence here.

Despite the long-standing importance of its role, Ealing Council’s case records prior to 2009 were stored on one officer’s drive and were deleted when he left. As a result, it was unable to find any record in respect of the complaints of RC-A418 in 2001, RC-A6 and RC‑A419 in 2004, the imposition of restrictions upon David Pearce in 2005 or the civil judgment against him in 2006. Carolyn Fair, the Director of Children’s Services at Ealing Council, has explained that the council’s response to allegations “became systematic” in 2009. Records of referrals are now processed and stored on a computerised social care database.

The inadequacy of historic record-keeping at Ealing Council is reflected in the insufficiency of the information provided by the LADO to the DfE in June 2009. The DfE contacted the LADO at Ealing, and was told by the LADO that the Ealing Child Protection Strategy Group wanted to alert the DfE to a concern “that indicated the school ethos was to cover up any problems”, although no other information or explanation was given. Most notably, there was no information given about the allegations against Pearce or his impending trial, nor was anything said about RC-F41 despite the Council having been informed in 2006 of historical allegations made against him. The DfE was entitled to expect more detail from the local authority, as in effect Ms Fair admitted. She stated that it was only around 2009 that the LADO role was created and a more consistent approach to record-keeping adopted at Ealing Council Children’s Services:

“If this LADO role and experience had been established in May 2009 I would expect the LADO to inform the then DCSF, now DfE, due to the number of specific allegations within one establishment.”

This however is extremely odd. The LADO role was defined in legislation long before 2009. What on earth was Ealing doing without one until then?

Afterword
A journalist spoke to me the other day. One of her questions was about why I had put in all the effort I did over the years. This report gives one good reason why. It had to be done and hardly anyone else was doing very much.